DISTINCTION OF THE ROADS IN OUR KNOWLEDGE

We seek the distinction of the roads in our *looking* knowledge here, not in our art or foresight. By *looking* knowledge, we mean knowledge for the sake of seeing or understanding, not knowledge for the sake of making or doing. A *road* in our knowledge is nothing other than the order, the before and after, in our knowledge and in things as known by us.

Since nature and reason are responsible for order in our experience, is the road in our knowledge made by nature or by reason?

The first road in our knowledge is made by nature, but the other roads are made by reason.

The first road in our knowledge is the natural road in our knowledge. And the natural road in our knowledge is the road from the senses into reason. Therefore, the first road in our knowledge is the road from the senses into reason.

Since the *nature* of a thing (or what it is) is what is *first* in it (for a thing must be what it is before it can be anything else), the first road in our knowledge must, of course, be the natural road in our knowledge.

And since man is by nature an animal with reason, the natural road in human knowledge is, of course, the road from the senses into reason. For *animal* is defined by having senses. But man is not *just* an animal, but also an animal *that has reason*. And what pertains to the genus (in this case *animal*) always comes before what is specific by the difference (which in this case is *has reason*) in time and generation. Hence, the natural road must be from the senses into reason.

The second road in our looking knowledge is the road of reason as reason. This road includes the common road of reasoned out knowledge. Since reason is the ability for discourse; and this means not only the ability to know one thing

after another, but also to know one thing from knowing another, we would expect a road for which reason is responsible.

This road is based on the before and after in the acts of looking reason. A complete understanding of this road involves seeing three before and afters in the acts of reason.

Reason understands what something is before putting together or separating such things in a statement and it forms statements before reasoning. Logic as a whole is divided by this distinction of three acts.

Reason guesses (or believes) before it knows. This is why reason is often mistaken and spends more time being mistaken than in knowing. And here we see the importance of reasonable guesses: "Let us not guess at random about the greatest things." Reasonable guesses are more apt to lead to knowledge; and if we do not get to knowledge, a reasonable guess is better than a wild one. Let us guess, then, by reason and by art (there is an art of guessing contained in Aristotle's eight books *About Places* (the *Topics*). Reason goes from guessing to knowing by finding the natural beginnings of reasoned out knowledge. In geometry, men tend to guess the same, but elsewhere they tend to guess opposites. Hence, the order and reasons for that order given in the beginning of the third book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy.* Like guessing before knowing, reason also often believes on the word of another before knowing.

Reason thinks about something before understanding it. Reason goes from thinking about something to understanding it by thinking it out. And there are as many senses of thinking out as there are of *in* or more.

The third road (or roads) in our looking knowledge is the private road of each reasoned out knowledge. This is based on the matter of that reasoned out knowledge. The private road of each reasoned out knowledge should fit its matter and how our reason is towards knowing that matter.

THE ORDER OF THESE ROADS

The natural road is before the roads made by reason and the roads made by reason are acquired by the natural road which enters into them.

The *private* road of each reasoned out knowledge presupposes and is based in part on the *common* road of reasoned out knowledge, which is part of the second road.

WHERE THESE ROADS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED

We begin to consider the natural road in natural philosophy. But the full consideration of this road belongs to wisdom. For this road directs us in all our knowledge and this is the office of the wise man.

The *first* and *natural* road, the road from the senses into reason, is proposed to the beginner in philosophy since it will underlie all his thinking. But the defense and understanding of this road belong officially to the wise man that directs everyone else.

The second road is considered in logic. For logic is about the acts of reason as reason. In logic, we learn both how to make reasonable guesses and the common road of reasoned out knowledge.

The private road of each reasoned out knowledge should be learned in the beginning of that particular knowledge after we know its matter and the end for which that matter is studied and can see how our reason is to knowing that matter for that end. For the private road of each reasoned out knowledge should be measured by its matter and also fit how our reason is to knowing that matter. Thus the private road of geometry should be studied in the beginning of geometry and the private road of ethics in the beginning of ethics.

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